14 Jun 2009
November 25th, 2008
- Tadayoshi Funaba opens Bug #794
in the Ruby Issue Tracking System describing a segmentation fault when huge
decimal strings are converted into
November 26th, 2008
- Matz closes Bug #794 with r20359
to Ruby 1.9’s trunk.
November 27th, 2008 to June 2nd, 2009
- Every site running Ruby 1.8.x which creates BigDecimal instances from
client-provided data is vulnerable to a Denial-of-Service attack which Ruby
Core developers have already fixed but not backported.
June 3rd, 2009
June 7th, 2009
- ruby-core notifies the vendor-sec
mailing list of the vulnerability.
June 8th, 2009
- Bug 273213 is created in
the Gentoo bug tracker to address CVE-2009-1904. Like most tickets for
as-yet-undisclosed security vulnerabilities, the ticket was marked
confidential and that “no information should be disclosed until [the
vulnerability] is made public.”
- Michael Koziarski creates a private GitHub project, bigdecimal-segfault-fix
with a workaround for the bug.
- Kirk Haines commits a change
to the RubySpec project which adds a test to ensure Ruby implementations
don’t “segfault when using a very large string to build [a BigDecimal].”
June 9th, 2009
June 10th, 2009
June 12th, 2009
June 13th, 2009
- A fix is released for Debian Unstable. This fix contains the bug that Barry Hess found.
June 14th, 2009
- No fix has been released for Ubuntu.
- No fix has been released for Red Hat.
- No fix has been released for Fedora Core.
- No fix has been released for Gentoo.
June 15th, 2009
- Ruby 1.8.7-p174 is released
This is not a coordinated disclosure. This is a clusterfuck. If you are
responsible for running a secure MRI/Ruby installation, your only hope is to pay
attention to all changes made to Ruby’s trunk and backport any fixes yourself.
Depending on your operating system vendor is not a viable strategy, as
downstream vendors are not given sufficient advance warning and are presented
with fixes which introduce other bugs or do not apply cleanly to the last
Updated June 16th, 2009
- Michael Koziarski dropped me a note to clarify a
few things. First, his GitHub project was private and was only opened to the
public after the vulnerability was announced. Second, ruby-core sent an
email to the vendor-sec mailing
list 48 hours before the disclosure. I’ve updated the timeline to reflect
- James Ludlow let me know about
a bug introduced in 1.8.7-p173 and fixed in 1.8.7-p174.
- Updated my conclusions based on the new information. Still not happy, but more
accurate in what I’m unhappy about.